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appropriate lags in vector autoregression (VAR) estimations. Granger causality tests, 
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1.  Introduction 
The growth of Chinese stock markets has been phenomenal. Less than 20 years since 
their establishment (in 1990 and 1991, respectively), the combined market 
capitalization of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges at the end of 2007 was 
roughly 4.4 trillion dollars, which trails Tokyo’s 4.8 trillion dollars by a narrow 
margin, and Tokyo is second only to New York. China’s stock markets, as well as her 
economy, now exert significant influence on other countries. When the Shanghai 
Composite Index dropped by 8.84% on February 27, 2007, it precipitated drops in 
stock prices in all the major stock markets of the world. However, this huge drop 
may have been a sign of weakness or inefficiency in the Chinese stock markets. This 
inefficiency, if it exists, should affect not only Chinese investors, but also investors in 
other countries because of international linkage of stock prices as well as 
international portfolio holdings. To the best of our knowledge, the efficiency and 
performance of Chinese stock markets has not yet been examined in detail. In this 
paper, we attempt to shed light on this issue.   
  There is much literature on the international linkage of stock prices (e.g., Jeon 
and von Furstenberg (1990), Hirayama and Tsutsui (1998), Masih and Masih (1999), 
Heimonen (2002), Bessler and Yang (2003), Worthington, Katsura, and Higgs (2003), 
and Darrat and Zhong (2005)). Almost all studies report on a bidirectional causality 
between pairs of stock prices. However, while Chinese stock prices are little affected 
by other markets, some major stock markets do respond to changes in Chinese stock 
prices (Huang, Yang, and Hu (2000), Groenewold, Tang, and Wu (2004), and Zhang 
2008)).
1 This finding suggests that Chinese stock markets are isolated from others 
and that their efficiency may still be in a fledgling stage. We find the lack of response 
                                                  
1 Chen and Liu (2008) analyze volatility spillover effects between China and other markets. They 




of Chinese stock prices to other markets interesting and worth exploring. 
  The primary purpose of this paper is to clarify whether Chinese stock markets 
are really isolated from markets in other countries. If such isolation exists, the next 
question is whether and when it will disappear. In this sense, a recent event comes to 
mind: the global stock market meltdown of September/October 2008. Although it 
started in the U.S.A., other stock markets responded, magnifying the negative effects. 
Chinese stock prices also plunged during this tumultuous period. Considering the 
wide-spread international spillover effects after Black Monday of 1987 (Tsutsui and 
Hirayama (2009), pp. 170-171), it may be that Chinese stock markets underwent 
‘globalization’ after the meltdown of 2008 and that their stock prices will henceforth 
be routinely and significantly swayed by global stock market movements. 
Investigation of this possibility is one of the purposes of this study.   
  The second purpose of this paper is to establish a methodology for 
investigating international stock price spillover effects using tick or high-frequency 
data. Most studies on this subject utilize daily, weekly, or monthly closing prices. 
However, vector autoregression (VAR) estimation using such data is an indirect 
method of measuring inter-market responses. For example, when studying New York 
and Tokyo, it should be noted that the two stock exchanges are not open 
simultaneously. When the New York stock market closes, Tokyo cannot respond 
because it is not yet open. It is only at market opening at 09:00 Japan Standard Time 
(JST) that Tokyo stock prices can respond to New York. As daily data typically 
consist of closing prices, all other sorts of information that drive stock prices during 
the day contaminate the effect of New York on the Tokyo market. By using 
high-frequency data, we can investigate the effect of the New York market at the 




  While using daily data produces a murky picture, when the stock markets 
under investigation are open for trading at the same time, analysis of bidirectional 
simultaneous causality becomes feasible and can yield interesting results. We can 
thus conduct direct tests of spillover effects with real-time, simultaneous data from 
the Tokyo, Shanghai, and Shenzhen markets and propose an appropriate method for 
such an analysis.   
  There is a line of research that utilizes intraday data from simultaneously 
open stock exchanges. Most such studies, however, focus on stocks that are 
cross-listed on two stock exchanges.
2 To the best of our knowledge, there are only 
two papers that analyze intraday stock price indexes for several stock exchanges 
observed simultaneously. One is Èerny and Koblas (2008) who utilized 
high-frequency data on stock price indexes from New York and six European cities. 
Using data of different frequencies, the authors found that mutual information is 
transmitted very rapidly, so that an empirical analysis of stock price linkages using 
daily data may not accurately capture the true reactions. The other is Égert and 
Kočenda (2007) who studied stock price spillover effects among six European cities 
using five-minute data. Although they found no cointegration, they reported evidence 
of short-term Granger causality. However, as will be explained in Section 2.3, neither 
of these papers seems to adopt appropriate lags in VAR estimation.   
  Tokyo, Shanghai, and Shenzhen are ideal for studying stock price spillover 
effects because the markets are open simultaneously for two periods each day. There 
is a 30-min window (10:30-11:00 JST) in the morning and a 60-min window 
                                                  
2 For example, Grammig, Melvin, and Schlag (2005) analyze three German stocks cross-listed in 
New York and Frankfurt. Hupperets and Menkveld (2002) examine seven blue-chip Dutch companies 
that are also listed in New York. Lok and Kalev (2006) investigate stocks of Australian and New 
Zealand companies that are cross-listed in the Australian and New Zealand markets. These papers 
focus on individual stocks to determine where price discovery occurs along the line developed by 




(14:00-15:00 JST) in the afternoon when the Tokyo and Chinese stock exchanges are 
open at the same time. In this paper we analyze the markets in Japan and China, 
focusing on the time windows when both exchanges are open. We utilize 
minute-by-minute stock returns in Granger causality tests, variance decompositions, 
and impulse response functions (IRF) to explore mutual interactions between the two 
countries. Special attention is paid to lagged values in VAR estimation (Section 2.3), 
one of the features of this paper.   
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the data and 
methodology. Section 3 presents estimation results. Section 4 examines whether 
Chinese markets became more efficient after the global financial crisis of 2008. 
Section 5 checks whether our lag methodology produces more plausible results and 
discusses possible causes of our results. The final section concludes the paper.   
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1. Methodology: Cointegration Tests and VAR Model Estimation   
  After preliminarily testing for unit roots that confirm commonly found 
nonstationarity in the indexes of the three stock exchanges, we check for 
cointegration between each pair of stock prices. We focus on two bivariate systems: 
the Tokyo-Shanghai and Tokyo-Shenzhen bivariate models, because we are 
interested in the bidirectional dependence between Japanese and Chinese markets. 
Shanghai-Shenzhen is analyzed merely as a reference. Since we employ bivariate 
systems, the number of cointegrating ranks is one, at most, and there is no need for 
system estimation by Johansen tests. We employ Engle-Granger two-step estimation 
to check for cointegration.
3 If cointegration exists, the VAR model should be 
                                                  




modified to a vector error correction (VEC) model. As shown later, our results 
indicate no evidence of cointegration between pairs. Consequently, we can make our 
estimations by conventional VAR models only, without VEC terms.   
  While long-run relationships are examined by cointegration tests, short-run 
dynamic interactions are analyzed by Granger causality tests, variance 
decompositions computations, and IRF, which are standard tools for short-run 
dynamic analysis.   
 
2.2. Data 
  We analyze return spillover effects between the Japanese and Chinese 
markets by focusing on pair-wise relations between Tokyo and Shanghai (or 
Shenzhen), using the Nikkei 225 Index and Shanghai (or Shenzhen) Composite 
Index. Minute-by-minute observations of these three indexes were obtained from 
Tickdata.com for the period from January 7, 2008, to January 23, 2009. Similar to 
the Dow Jones 30 Industrials Index, Nikkei 225 is an arithmetic average of 225 
representative stocks traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Although the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges trade A shares for domestic investors (traded in local 
currency) and B shares for foreign investors (traded in US dollars in Shanghai and 
HK dollars in Shenzhen), only composite indexes of all shares were available to us. 
Daily closing prices for our sample period are plotted in Figure 1, showing 
downward trends in both Chinese markets and reflecting adjustments following the 
bursting of a stock market bubble in China that started in November 2007. The 
Nikkei average hovered between 12,000 and 14,000 until September/October 2008 
after which it plunged to around 8000.   
                                                                                                                                             




  Trading hours for the three stock exchanges are given in Figure 2. In Tokyo, 
opening prices are determined by batch trading (itayose). After opening at 09:00 JST, 
a continuous auction takes place until 11:00. After a 90-min lunch break, the 
afternoon session starts at 12:30 and ends at 15:00. In both Chinese markets, 
pre-market call auctions between 09:15 and 09:25 (Chinese Standard Time, CST) 
determine the opening prices for the day. Continuous auction takes place between 
09:30 and 11:30 for the morning session and between 13:00 and 15:00 (14:57 in the 
case of Shenzhen) for the afternoon session. Since there is a one-hour time difference 
between Japan and China, the only times during which all three stock exchanges are 
simultaneously open for trading are 10:30 to 11:00 and 14:00 to 15:00 (JST). We 
focus on these two windows of 30 minutes and 60 minutes in this study.   
 
2.3. Data Selection 
  In defining the dataset we use the VAR model, which utilizes many lags. In 
summary, the rules we use are characterized by the following four points: (a) 
minute-by-minute stock prices when the stock exchanges are simultaneously open, 
i.e., 10:31 to 11:00 and 14:01 to 15:00; (b) to avoid biases due to asymmetric 
treatment of opening prices, we drop the first ten observations in each window. This 
deletes the opening prices on the Chinese markets, resulting in slightly different 
windows, 10:41 to 11:00 and 14:11 to 15:00, each day. Otherwise, our calculations 
would include opening prices in China but not in Japan. Since stock prices at and 
immediately following the openings of stock markets reflect information 
accumulated during night-time non-trading hours and are more volatile than prices 
during normal trading hours, it is necessary to exclude opening prices of both 




combining data from the windows; and (d) the basic dataset constructed under rules 
(a) through (c), above, includes appropriate regression lags. To explain stock returns 
observed at 10:41 in Tokyo, there are lagged returns on the right-hand side of the 
VAR equation. Since the dataset is a combined series of data from two windows each 
day, a one-period lag for the Tokyo index at 10:41 is that of 15:00 of the previous 
day; a two-period lag is that of 14:59; etc. However, true lags are the index at 10:40, 
10:39, etc. Only these truly relevant lags should be used as explanatory variables for 
VAR equations. The same applies to the Chinese regression equations. Due to 
deletion of the first ten observations from each window, true lagged values are 
available from these deleted data points.   
  Levels and rates of change for the three indexes are provided in Table 1. The 
data are obtained for 20 min in the morning and 50 min in the afternoon. For 
minute-by-minute rates of change, Tokyo’s mean is smaller than those of Shanghai 
and Shenzhen, but the standard deviations are about the same in all three markets. 
However, the maximum and minimum in Tokyo are two to three times larger (in 
absolute value) than those of China. The kurtosis of Tokyo returns is over 22.5 
whereas it is only 1.5 in Shanghai and 2.2 in Shenzhen, indicating much fatter tails in 
the distribution of returns in Tokyo. As with other stock price returns, the 
Jarque-Bera test of normality strongly rejects the null of normality, but the extent of 
this rejection is extreme in Tokyo, apparently due to its large kurtosis.   
 
3. Results 
3.1. Unit Root Tests 
  The logged levels and rates of change of the three stock price indexes are tested 




tests. Results are shown in Table 2 . A constant term is included in the regression, but a 
linear time trend is not. The result is typical of stock prices, namely, levels can be 
regarded as I(1) but rates of change are stationary, i.e., I(0).  
 
3.2. Engle-Granger Tests of Cointegration  
  Since all three stock price levels are I(1), we next test for cointegration of 
logged stock prices in each bivariate system. Results are displayed in Table 3 . 
According to critical values as given by MacKinnon (1991), the null of nonstationarity 
in the residuals cannot be rejected, indicating absence of cointegration for the two 
bivariate systems: Tokyo-Shanghai and Tokyo-Shenzhen. Thus, we can safely proceed 
to estimating a conventional VAR model without error correction terms.  
  For reference purposes, we also compute the Engle-Granger tests for the 
Shanghai-Shenzhen system. When Shanghai is the dependent variable, the null of a 
unit root in the regression residual cannot be rejected at a 5% confidence level. 
However, when Shenzhen is the dependent variable, the null is rejected at a 10% 
level. There is mild evidence of cointegration between Shanghai and Shenzhen, 
which is plausible given their highly correlated movements (see Figure 1). 
 
3.3. VAR Estimation and Granger Causality Tests   
  Since variables in VAR models must be stationary, we use minute-by-minute 
rates of change in the three stock indexes. The two bivariate VAR systems 
(Tokyo-Shanghai and Tokyo-Shenzhen) are estimated by ordinary least squares 
(OLS) with White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent variance-covariance matrix. To 
determine the optimal lag order of the VAR model, we examine Ljung-Box Q 




eliminate serial correlation in the residuals. We thus adopt this lag order for all the 
following VAR models.
4  
  After estimating VAR(10) for the two bivariate systems, we conduct Granger 
causality tests for each set of lagged variables. The null hypothesis is that all ten 
coefficients on lagged values are zero, whose test statistic is distributed as 
Chi-squared. Results are presented in Table 4 . Own lags are all highly significant. 
We, however, are interested in cross terms. Shanghai Granger causes Tokyo very 
significantly, but Tokyo Granger causes Shanghai with only 3.85% significance. 
Shenzhen also Granger causes Tokyo very significantly, but Tokyo’s effect on 
Shenzhen is not significant. Its p-value is 41%, indicating an absence of Granger 
causality from Tokyo to Shenzhen. We also compute the Granger causality tests for 
the Shanghai-Shenzhen system. Cross causality is extremely significant between the 
two exchanges, indicating a very substantial mutual influence between Shanghai and 
Shenzhen.  
  While Tokyo responds to Shanghai and Shenzhen in the sense of Granger 
causality, Shanghai’s response to Tokyo is somewhat weak and Shenzhen does not 
respond to Tokyo at all. These results are consistent with those of the studies on daily 
return spillovers between China and other countries (Huang, Yang, and Hu (2000), 
Groenewold, Tang, and Wu (2004), and Zhang (2008)).   
 
3.4. Autocorrelation Functions 
  Another feature that characterizes Chinese markets is the extremely large test 
                                                  
4  The lag order was altered from 1 to 20 and both Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz 
Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) were computed. The regressions to explain Tokyo exhibit 
minimal AIC and SBIC at nine lags. But, the regressions to explain Shanghai or Shenzhen do not 
exhibit local minima between 1 and 20 lags. Stock prices in these exchanges seem to have a strong 
and persistent serial correlation, which might imply lack of efficiency in information processing. In 




statistic for its own lags. Table 4 shows that while Tokyo’s lags in the equation to 
explain Tokyo produce a Chi-squared test statistic of 66, those of Shanghai and 
Shenzhen are 15,845 and 32,905, respectively. This apparently results from very 
strong serial correlation in Chinese stock returns, and may be a sign of relative 
inefficiency in the Chinese stock markets. Although autocorrelation arises from 
various reasons such as bid-ask bounces and non-synchronized trading, which may 
not reflect efficiency, serial correlation reflects market inefficiency and is worth 
examining. An easy way to check this is to compute autocorrelation functions (ACF). 
Figure 3 shows that the magnitude of autocorrelation at one-minute lags is almost 10 
times greater in Shanghai or Shenzhen than in Tokyo, suggesting informational 
inefficiency in the Chinese markets.   
  The ACF of Tokyo exhibit spikes at five-minute intervals. However, as 
Tsutsui et al. (2007) made clear, this merely reflects automatic updating of special 
quotes, and is not evidence of high autocorrelation of actual prices. On the other 
hand, ACF of Shanghai and Shenzhen are cyclical, having significantly and 
numerically large peaks and troughs that may indicate overreaction in stock prices 
and subsequent adjustments. According to the overreaction hypothesis proposed by 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985), abnormal negative (positive) returns follow positive 
(negative) events. Although they analyzed the predicted profitability of long-term 
winners and losers, the hypothesis also applies to the short-term reversal of stock 
prices, e.g., Ketcher and Jordan (1994). Thus, not only the magnitude of the ACF, but 
also their cycles may be evidence of informational inefficiency on the Chinese 
markets. 
  




  A VAR model can be converted into a vector moving average (VMA) and the 
forecast error variance decomposed into factors explained by each disturbance. In 
Table 5 , we compute such decomposition at 30-min horizons. In the Tokyo-Shanghai 
system, Shanghai accounts for only 0.361% of the forecast error variance of Tokyo’s 
minute-by-minute returns, while the remaining portion (99.639%) is explained by 
Tokyo’s own shocks (the latter figure not shown in the table because it is trivial). In 
the decomposition of Shanghai, Tokyo explains an even smaller percent (0.231%) of 
Shanghai’s variance and the rest is explained by Shanghai’s own shocks. In the 
Tokyo-Shenzhen system, Shenzhen explains 0.314% of Tokyo’s variance, while 
Tokyo explains only 0.192% of Shenzhen’s. Although Granger causality tests 
indicate some causality from China to Japan, the proportion of forecast error variance 
explained by China is numerically quite small. And Tokyo’s influence on Chinese 
markets is even smaller. Using the same dataset, we compute variance 
decompositions for the Shanghai-Shenzhen bivariate system. Within China, the 
proportion explained by the other stock exchange is very large.
5 These results 
suggest that the linkage between Chinese and Japanese markets is quite weak. The 
same tendency can be found using daily data. Zhang (2008) reports that only 0.05% 
of China’s 20-day ahead forecast error variance is accounted for by shocks to Japan 
and that 0.15% of Japan’s forecast error variance is explained by events in China. 
Using a four-country VAR (U.S., U.K., Germany, and Japan) and daily data, 
Hirayama and Tsutsui (1998) found that 6.5% of a 20-day ahead forecast error 
variance of Japan is explained by the U.S. and that 2.0% of the U.S. variance is 
accounted for by Japan. These magnitudes are much larger than the ones we find 
                                                  
5  While 13.5% of the forecast error variance of Shanghai is accounted for by Shenzhen, 69.2% of 
Shenzhen is explained by Shanghai. Thus, the influence of Shanghai over Shenzhen is substantially 




between Japan and China.   
 
3.6. Impulse Response Functions   
  Our next tool to analyze short-run interactions is IRF, which are actually 
coefficients of the VMA model. They capture how a shock to one variable arising at 
a certain period affects endogenous variables in subsequent periods.   
  The IRF for the Tokyo-Shanghai system are plotted in Figure 4. Responses to 
own shocks are far greater in magnitude than responses to shocks on the other stock 
market. The maximum on the ‘own’ charts is 20 times greater than on the ‘cross’ 
charts, consistent with the results of variance decomposition. However, although the 
responses of Tokyo to its own shocks dissipate very quickly (within some 10 min), 
Shanghai’s responses to its own shocks oscillate and are statistically quite significant 
for about 30 min. This cyclical pattern may be a result of overreaction in one 
direction and subsequent adjustments in the reverse direction, which also caused 
strong serial correlation in Shanghai’s stock returns.   
  In the ‘cross’ charts, more of Tokyo’s responses are statistically significant 
than those of Shanghai up to 10 lags, in agreement with results of the Granger 
causality tests that indicate more significant response of Tokyo to Shanghai than of 
Shanghai to Tokyo. Shanghai’s responses exhibit an oscillating pattern which may be 
a sign of overreaction of the Shanghai stock market to Tokyo, although negative 
responses at 8 and 9-min lags are not statistically significant.   
  Figure 5 shows that the IRF of the Tokyo-Shenzhen system are generally 
similar to those of the Tokyo-Shanghai system. The cross IRF are qualitatively 
similar to those of Tokyo-Shanghai. Tokyo’s responses to Shenzhen are slightly more 




oscillate, although most are not statistically significant.   
 
4. Were the Chinese Stock Markets Transformed by the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2008? 
4.1. The Global Financial Crisis and International Linkage of Stock Prices 
  In the previous section we determined that Chinese stock markets are not 
much affected by Tokyo, i.e., international return spillover effects are unidirectional 
from China to Japan. However, during our sample period, the New York stock 
market experienced a precipitous plunge that had far-reaching effects on other 
markets. Just as international stock price comovements were reinforced after Black 
Monday of 1987, the 2008 global financial crisis may have strengthened 
international return spillover effects so that, during our sample period, China may 
have undergone changes in its responsiveness to Tokyo. In this section we examine 
whether China became more responsive to Tokyo after the stock market crash of 
September/October 2008. To do so, we split the sample into two subperiods and 
recompute some of our tests. The first subperiod is January 7, 2008, to August 29, 
2008; the second is September 1, 2008, to January 23, 2009.   
 
4.2. Granger Causality Tests: Causality from Tokyo to China Became Stronger 
  The Granger causality results are presented in Table 4 . Focusing on cross 
effects, we immediately notice that Chinese markets seem to have paid more 
attention to developments in Tokyo in the second, turbulent, post crisis period of 
2008.
6 Namely, the p-value of the Chi-squared statistic testing the explanatory 
                                                  
6 While Shanghai and Shenzhen significantly Granger cause Tokyo in the first period, their 
significance declined substantially and they are barely statistically significant at a 10% confidence 
level in the second period. During the second period, variability was wider in Tokyo (see Figure 1), 




power of Tokyo over Shanghai is 0.1987 in the first period, but 0.0656 in the second, 
indicating increased significance of Tokyo (see shaded cells). The influence of Tokyo 
over Shenzhen changed similarly. According to the causality results in the second 
period, the relative independence of Chinese stock prices seems to have disappeared.   
 
4.3. Variance Decompositions: Sensitivity of Chinese Markets Became Stronger 
  Next, we re-estimate the forecast error variance decompositions for the two 
subperiods. Results are shown in Table 5 . In agreement with the above, the 
explanatory power of Tokyo over Shanghai and Shenzhen increased three and four 
times in the second period.
7  Tokyo’s share is even greater than those of Shanghai or 
Shenzhen in accounting for Tokyo’s error variance in the second period. Again, this 
is evidence of increasing sensitivity of the Chinese markets to Japan.   
 
4.4. Impulse Response Functions: Response of Chinese Markets Became Stronger 
  The IRF for the Tokyo-Shanghai system are estimated for the two subperiods 
and shown in Figure 6. Tokyo’s responses to its own shocks are greater in the second 
period than in the first, probably because of much higher market volatility. Likewise, 
Tokyo’s responses to shocks in Shanghai are generally greater and more prolonged in 
the second period. Even starker are Shanghai’s responses to Tokyo in the second 
period. In the first period, the IRF oscillated greatly with positive and negative values 
but, in the second period, the IRF tended to remain positive with a larger magnitude. 
The IRF of the Tokyo-Shenzhen model has almost identical results as in Figure 7. 
Consistent with the findings of the Granger causality and variance decompositions 
tests, the IRF also indicates a more significant response of the Chinese markets to 
                                                  




Tokyo in the second period.  
 
4.5. Nonetheless, Chinese Markets Have Not Been Transformed   
  The question remains, did the Chinese stock markets undergo a permanent 
change after the global financial crisis, or were they temporarily linked to Tokyo 
during this turbulent period?  
  To check whether the change in sensitivity of Chinese markets is permanent or 
temporary, we re-compute the above tests using data from November 3, 2008, onwards, 
i.e., after the rapid fall ceased. Results appear in Tables IV and V. The Granger 
causality tests reveal that Shanghai and Shenzhen are not significantly explained by 
Tokyo in this period, suggesting that the increased influence of Tokyo was temporary 
and limited to September and October 2008. However, variance decomposition for the 
period after November 3, 2008, indicates otherwise; the proportions of forecast error 
variance explained by Tokyo remain rather high (Table 5). However, the variance 
decomposition results were not tested for statistical significance. We tend to trust the 
Granger causality tests which test statistical significance and lead to the conclusion 
that the Chinese markets remain isolated.  
  Since serial correlation at least partially reflects market efficiency, we compare 
the magnitude and pattern of ACF before and after the financial crisis. Results are 
shown in Figure 8. The qualitative pattern remains the same in the second period, even 
though the amplitude is slightly smaller. The same is true for ACF after November 3, 
2008. Thus, efficiency in the Chinese markets seems to be unchanged in the second 
period.  
 




  After analyzing stock price spillover effects between Tokyo and two Chinese 
stock markets (Shanghai and Shenzhen) using a novel VAR estimation with correct 
lagged values, we check in this section whether our methodology produces more 
plausible results than those obtained from conventional VAR estimation. Next, we 
interpret the results, considering possible causes of the international interdependence 
of the stock prices. 
 
5.1. Evaluation of Our Methodology 
  We use tick data from three stock exchanges and methods (a) through (d) in 
section 2.3 to select data for analysis. First, let us see what happens if we do not follow 
(d), above. Using the same dataset for the dependent variable, we change the lag 
variable from the true lag to one that shifts the dependent variable just one period, as 
in normal VAR estimations. Using these incorrect lag values, we may underestimate 
the true effects of the lags. Results of Granger causality tests carried out by 
conventional VAR estimation are shown in Table 6 . The Chi-squared statistics are 
generally smaller than in Table 4 . Thus, using incorrect lag variables generally 
reduces statistical significance, as we conjectured.  
  Next, we disregard rule (b) of subsection 2.3 and include the first ten 
observations following the opening of each trade session in China. We line up the data 
for the 30-min and 60-min windows contiguously. The windows include the opening 
prices of the Chinese markets, but not of the Tokyo market. Since opening prices 
respond to information accumulated during non-trading hours, their responsiveness is 
stronger than during normal trading hours. Since the data for Tokyo do not include 
opening prices, comparing the magnitude of responses is unfair. Results are given in 




increases, confirming our prediction that the inclusion of opening prices distorts 
causality results. The difference is starker in the case of Shenzhen. There, the p-value 
of the causality of Tokyo on Shenzhen is 0.4088 in Table 4  but only 0.0341 in Table 
6 , leading to the wrong conclusion that Shenzhen does respond to Tokyo. On the other 
hand, the p-value of the causality of Tokyo on Shanghai declines by a small amount.
8 
In sum, both rules of data selection, (b) and (d), are necessary to obtain undistorted 
results. In particular, symmetric treatment regarding exclusion of opening prices is 
critical to reach the conclusion that responses of the Chinese and Japanese markets to 
each other are asymmetric. 
 
5.2. Possible Causes of Why Chinese Markets Do Not Respond to the Tokyo Market   
  A main result of our analysis is that while Chinese markets seem to affect the 
Tokyo market, the effect of Japan’s market on China seems to be almost zero. In fact, 
according to the Granger causality test, there is no statistically significant effect of 
Tokyo on Shenzhen. What causes this result?  
  Our sample period includes the bursting of a stock price bubble in China that 
can be interpreted as causing an asymmetric response in China.
9 It can be argued that 
during the burst, stock price volatility in China became so great that it affected Japan 
more than the other way round. However, Table I reveals that this is not the case. 
Indeed, the maximum and minimum Tokyo returns are roughly twice those of China, 
though the standard deviations are similar in all three markets. Therefore, if we extract 
                                                  
8 Although fundamentally very significant, the Chi-squared test statistics for own lags in the two 
Chinese markets become much smaller. With this dataset, lagged values for the opening prices are 
inevitably those from the previous day or window, which would normally have less explanatory power 
than immediate lags.   
9  Another factor accounting for the asymmetry between the countries is that China lists stocks of state 
enterprises, especially A shares whose liquidity is especially low. We hypothesize that these shares 





Tokyo’s minute-by-minute returns that fall within China’s maximum/minimum range, 
they should have less significant impact on China. This would reinforce our results in 
Section 3 that Chinese markets are not influenced by Tokyo.  
  To verify this statement, we divide Tokyo returns into those that fall within the 
maximum/minimum range of Chinese returns and those beyond this range. We then 
test the Granger causality of the two categories, large and small changes in Tokyo. We 
found: (a) both large and small changes in Tokyo impact Shanghai at 5% but not 1% 
significance, and (b) Tokyo’s large changes have no impact on Shenzhen at 5% 
significance and Tokyo’s small changes have no impact even at 20% significance. 
These results are basically the same as in Table 4 . This is because there are very few 
data points, only 47 (0.28%) of 16,920 observations, that belong to the ‘large’ category 
of changes and the ‘small’ changes are almost identical to the whole sample, making 
their explanatory power almost equal to that of the whole.  
  Asymmetric causality between Tokyo and China can be attributed to different 
investor behaviors. We claim that Japanese investors pay attention to Chinese stock 
prices in determining their portfolios, but that Chinese investors do not study Japanese 
prices. This implies that Chinese investors collect less information than their Japanese 
counterparts and is consistent with the long and persistent serial correlations amply 
shown by IRF and ACF (Figures 3, 4, and 5).  
 
6. Conclusion 
  In this paper we analyze intraday minute-by-minute data from the Tokyo, 
Shanghai, and Shenzhen stock exchanges to investigate mutual interaction between 
Japanese and Chinese stock markets. Specifically, we focused on a 20-min window 




afternoon during which all three stock exchanges are simultaneously trading shares. 
Our basic tool of empirical analysis was estimation of two bivariate VAR models 
(Tokyo-Shanghai and Tokyo-Shenzhen). Our methodology, we believe, correctly 
specifies the appropriate lagged variables in VAR equations. It also avoids using the 
volatile values that characterize the Chinese market after opening, thus treating the 
two markets symmetrically.   
  We then conduct Granger causality tests, variance decompositions, and 
computed IRF. Empirical analyses with the entire sample (from January 7, 2008, to 
January 23, 2009) confirmed findings from earlier studies using daily data that China 
is relatively isolated from other countries. The Shenzhen market, which is much 
smaller than the Shanghai market, seems to be more autonomous than Shanghai. 
However, Tokyo seems to be statistically significantly impacted by Chinese stock 
price movements, implying that Japanese investors are more internationally oriented 
and alert to foreign markets than Chinese investors.   
  Another feature of the Chinese stock markets is the fact that their 
minute-by-minute stock returns exhibit strong and persistent serial correlation. The 
IRF to their own shocks exhibit very significant and numerically large effects, with 
oscillating patterns of influence. This may reflect overreaction. Namely, stock prices 
overreact to new information, which is later reversed, indicating relative 
informational inefficiency.   
  Many studies show that after Black Monday, the world’s stock markets became 
more cointegrated. Likewise, the global financial crisis of 2008 might have ushered in 
the internationalization of Chinese stock investors. To check, we split our sample into 
two subperiods at the end of August. We found that while China did not respond to 




conclude that China became permanently attentive to Tokyo from September onwards. 
Indeed, if we exclude the September and October data points from the second period, 
the Granger causality tests qualitatively returned to the results of the first period. This 
implies that Chinese markets were subject to influences from Japan only during 
September/October 2008, and that Chinese markets are still basically isolated from 
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Stock Price Indexes of Tokyo, Shanghai, and Shenzhen 
The stock price indexes used for Tokyo, Shanghai, and Shenzhen are the Nikkei 225, Shanghai Composite, 
and Shenzhen Composite Indexes, which are determined at a minute-by-minute frequency. The sample 
period is January 7, 2008, to January 23, 2009. Intraday data are for the 20-min period from 10:41 to 11:00 
and the 50-min period from 14:11 to 15:00 (Japan Standard Time). The number of observations is 16,920. 
The rates of change are not log differences, but arithmetic rates of change from the previous minute. JB is 
the Jarque-Bera test of normality. The p-value is its significance. 
   Variable  Mean  St.  Dev. Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis  JB  p-value 
Logged Level  Tokyo  9.36388  0.21067  9.59177  8.85910  -0.84368  -1.00670  2721.75  0.0000 
Shanghai 7.93030 0.32603  8.61251 7.42791 0.31680  -1.08355  1110.74  0.0000 
Shenzhen 6.70379 0.35473  7.36228 6.11737 0.22869  -1.22856  1211.58  0.0000 
Minute-by-Minute 
Rate of Change 
Tokyo 0.00074  0.08298  1.07348  -1.54325  -0.55788  22.52593  358607.17  0.0000 
Shanghai 0.00111 0.08803  0.49049  -0.47809 0.07260  1.53379  1673.37  0.0000 






Unit Root Tests for Nonstationarity of Three Stock Price Indexes 
The logged levels and rates of change of the stock price indexes of the Tokyo, Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges are tested for nonstationarity by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) and Phillips-Perron tests. AR gives the order of lagged dependent variables in the ADF 
regression. The order increases if a serial correlation remains in the residual series at a 10% 
significance level. In this table, all the series need only one lagged dependent variable to 
eliminate serial correlation. The sample period and intraday data are defined in Table I. 
Stock Price Index  Augmented Dickey-Fuller    Phillips-Perron 
  T ( $ ) ρ − 1 τ AR Z $ ρ   Z$ τ 
Logged Level     
 Nikkei  225  -0.87 -0.4159 1 -0.89 -0.4245 
 Shanghai  Composite  -2.46 -1.7724 1 -2.47 -1.7702 
 Shenzhen  Composite  -2.1 -1.5592 1 -2.1 -1.5573 
Rate of Change in Index (%)       
 Nikkei  225  -12824.09 -80.0594 1 -16366.08 -119.0206 
 Shanghai  Composite  -6364.98 -56.4053 1 -5626.75 -56.9562 







Engle-Granger Tests of Cointegration for Tokyo-Shanghai and Tokyo-Shenzhen Systems 
Regressions include a constant and a linear trend. For each of the three bivariate systems 
(including Shanghai-Shenzhen for reference), the regressor and the dependent variable are 
reversed to check for consistency. The t-statistic tests for a unit root in the residuals from the 
bivariate regressions. Critical values for the t-statistic are: -4.33 (1%), -3.78 (5%), and -3.50 
(10%), based on MacKinnon (1991). For data description, see Table I. 
 
Dependent Variable Explanatory Variable  t-statistic 
Tokyo   Shanghai  -1.9645 
Shanghai   Tokyo  -2.3776 
Tokyo Shenzhen  -1.9011 
Shenzhen Tokyo  -1.4356 
Shanghai   Shenzhen  -3.9238 






Granger Causality Tests for Tokyo-Shanghai and Tokyo-Shenzhen Systems 
Granger causality tests are conducted by testing the hypothesis that all ten 
coefficients of the lagged variables are zero. The test statistic is distributed as 
Chi-squared. The full period is from January 7, 2008, to January 23, 2009, and 
contains 16,920 observations. The first (pre-financial crisis) period is from January 7 
to August 29, 2008, with 10,584 observations. The second (post-financial crisis) 
period is from September 1, 2008, to January 23, 2009, with 6336 observations. The 
period after November 3, 2008 (after the rapid fall of prices ceased) has 3672 
observations. The p-value of the Chi-squared statistic testing for the explanatory 
power of Tokyo over Shanghai is 0.1987 for the first period, but 0.0656 in the second, 
indicating an increased influence of Tokyo after the global financial crises of 
September/October 2008 (shown in shaded cells). 
 
From    To  Full Period  First Period  Second Period  Period after November 3, 
2008 
 Chi  Square  p-value Chi  Square p-value Chi  Square p-value Chi  Square p-value 
Tokyo  →  Tokyo 65.63  0.0000  52.16 0.0000  49.39 0.0000    22.42  0.0131 
Shanghai   →  Tokyo 41.56  0.0000  67.63 0.0000  17.39 0.0661    18.96  0.0407 
Tokyo  →  Shanghai 19.15  0.0385  13.47 0.1987  17.42 0.0656   9.52  0.4837 
Shanghai  →  Shanghai 15,845.29 0.0000  13,198.37 0.0000  4106.34 0.0000    2714.20  0.0000 
        
Tokyo  →  Tokyo 65.54  0.0000  52.54 0.0000  49.28 0.0000    22.81  0.0115 
Shenzhen  →  Tokyo 44.59  0.0000  65.2 0.0000  16.07 0.0977    16.85  0.0778 
Tokyo  →  Shenzhen 10.37  0.4088  12.32 0.2644  17.44 0.0651   7.35  0.6922 
Shenzhen  →  Shenzhen 32,905.13 0.0000  21,469.37 0.0000 4407.5 0.0000    3126.59  0.0000 
        
Shanghai  →  Shanghai  1929.82    0.0000  1672.48 0.0000 525.23 0.0000    306.68  0.0000 
Shenzhen  →  Shanghai  1629.86    0.0000  1073.46 0.0000 605.88 0.0000    542.98  0.0000 
Shanghai  →  Shenzhen  3826.25   0.0000  2753.01  0.0000 1353.62  0.0000   860.32  0.0000 







Variance Decomposition for Tokyo-Shanghai and Tokyo-Shenzhen Systems 
Forecast error variance decomposition is computed for each system. Since the 
systems are bivariate, only cross results are displayed. The remainder is accounted 
for by the other variable. The forecast horizon is 30 periods (minutes). When the 
causal ordering is reversed, the result is almost unchanged, because the correlation 
between the two residuals is small. For definitions of the periods, see Table 4. 




Tokyo   Shanghai  0.361% 0.780% 0.366%  0.513%
Shanghai   Tokyo  0.231% 0.153% 0.507%  0.640%
Tokyo Shenzhen  0.314% 0.758% 0.315%  0.482%
Shenzhen Tokyo  0.192% 0.111% 0.486% 0.675%
For reference only 
Shanghai   Shenzhen  13.538% 13.465% 13.007%  17.411%





Results of Granger Causality Tests, if our Data Construction Rules are Disregarded 
This table indicates the results of the Granger causality tests if the dataset is formed 
disregarding our rules of construction. Column (1) shows the results if rule (d) of subsection 
2.3 is violated, i.e., lags on the right-hand side of a regression are based on the usual method 
of referring to values from previous periods. Column (2) shows the results if, in addition to 
rule (d), we disregard rule (b), i.e., opening prices of the Chinese markets are included in the 




To  Conventional VAR Estimation 
(1) 
Chinese Data Including 
Opening Prices 
(2) 
Chi Square  p-value Chi  Square  p-value 
Tokyo   → Tokyo    62.59 0.0000 59.32  0.0000
Shanghai   → Tokyo    29.55 0.0010 24.12  0.0073
Tokyo   → Shanghai    24.93 0.0055 20.75  0.0229
Shanghai  → Shanghai    11,978.13 0.0000 266.03  0.0000
      
Tokyo   → Tokyo    62.29 0.0000 59.06  0.0000
Shenzhen  → Tokyo    33.00 0.0003 24.04  0.0075
Tokyo   → Shenzhen  10.75 0.3775 19.53  0.0341


















Figure 1. Daily closing stock prices on Tokyo, Shanghai, and Shenzhen markets. Shown 

































Figure 2. Trading hours of the Tokyo, Shanghai, and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. 
Hours are according to time in Tokyo (Japan Standard Time, JST). Overlapping 
hours (windows of simultaneous trading) are shaded.
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Figure 3. Autocorrelation functions of Tokyo, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. Minute by minute returns and 95% confidence levels shown.  




Figure 4. Impulse responses of Tokyo-Shanghai VAR model. 95% Confidence bands are based on 10,000 random draws.  




Figure 5. Impulse responses of Tokyo-Shenzhen VAR model. 95% Confidence bands are based on 10,000 random draws.  
















Figure 6. Impulse response functions in Tokyo-Shanghai VAR model: Split sample. Since the graphs are cluttered with so many lines, 




Figure 7. Impulse response functions in Tokyo-Shenzhen VAR model: Split sample. Since the graphs are cluttered with so many lines, 




Figure 8. Autocorrelation functions of three stock returns: split sample. First period is from January 7 to August 29, 2008; the 
second period is from September 1, 2008, to January 23, 2009. Horizontal axis measures time in minutes.     